Skip to content
Threats Guide

Tailgating (Piggybacking)

DraftLast reviewed Oct 11, 2026Edit this page on GitHub

This page is a draft: its scripts were tested in a lab, but its references still need an independent review.

Last reviewed: 2026-10-11 | Status: Draft (new topic; scripts tested against local lab targets, references not yet independently re-verified)

Standards mapping

FrameworkReference
OWASP Top 10:2025not applicable
MITRE ATT&CK (v19)not applicable (physical access)
CWEnot applicable
CAPECnot applicable
Control referenceNIST SP 800-53 PE-3 Physical Access Control

What it is

Tailgating is entering a controlled area by following an authorised person through a door, often by looking busy, carrying boxes, or simply asking someone to hold the door. The attacker needs no badge.

How it works

The attack relies on politeness. People hesitate to challenge a stranger. A successful entry gives physical access to workstations, network ports, server rooms and paper records.

Real-world example

No single incident is cited here yet. Physical-intrusion assessments regularly report tailgating as a successful method; add a primary source when expanding this section.

Detection

  • Door sensors counting more people than badge events (PEOPLE_MISMATCH)
  • A badge entering twice without leaving (ANTI_PASSBACK) or at two doors too quickly (IMPOSSIBLE_TRAVEL)
  • Doors forced or held open; after-hours entries; repeated denials followed by a grant
  • tailgating_log_analyzer.py finds all of these in an access-control CSV

Prevention

In order of strength. The first items fix the cause; the rest reduce risk.

  1. Mantraps or turnstiles at sensitive entrances
  2. Anti-passback and door-held-open alarms in the access-control system
  3. Visible staff badges; visitors escorted and issued a different badge
  4. A culture and a script that makes challenging politely normal: "Can I see your badge?"
  5. Cameras at doors, reviewed when the analyzer flags an event

Scripts in this topic

Common mistakes

  • Relying on a badge reader alone: it authenticates one person, not the people behind them
  • Leaving alarms off because they cause false positives instead of tuning them
  • Training only reception staff

Test it safely

Use the provided sample_access_log.csv, which contains one planted example of each rule. Physical penetration tests need written authorisation.

References